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WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE NURSING HOME,
 
INC.: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
 
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. the Supreme Judi­
cial Court of Massachusetts decided that a shareholder in a closely 
held corporation could not be frozen out from participating in the 
corporation unless there was a legitimate business reason for his 
exclusion and this business purpose “could [not] have been 
achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the 
minority’s interest.”1  This opinion was preceded, fifteen months 
earlier, by Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., where the same court 
decided that a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation 
had to be extended an “equal opportunity” to sell her shares back 
to the corporation if that privilege was afforded to a controlling 
shareholder.2  Both cases were grounded on the rationale that a 
closely held corporation ought to be viewed as a partnership and, as 
such, the shareholders owe to one another the fiduciary duties that 
partners owe to one another.3 
Interestingly, in neither case did the court delve into the intri­
cacies of partnership law.4  Rather, the court seemed to assume that 
if partnership law applied, the plaintiff in each case would prevail.5 
While the court’s unstated assumption may not be correct—espe­
cially in a fact situation like the one in Donahue6—the notion that 
* Monfort Professor of Commercial Law, University of Colorado Law School. 
The author thanks Shirin Chahal (Class of 2011) and Laura Ellenberger (Class of 2011) 
for their excellent research assistance.  Ms. Chahal was also the primary author of Part 
III of this Article.  The author also thanks Professors Andrew Schwartz and Eric 
Gouvin for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
2. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 519 (Mass. 1975). 
3. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
4. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661-62; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
5. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519-20. 
6. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 377, 439-40 (2004) (noting that partnership fiduciary law does not serve the 
function of prohibiting freeze-outs or requiring equal treatment, but rather, these con­
cepts are statutory). 
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shareholders owe fiduciary duties to their co-shareholders would 
certainly give rise to shareholder liability in many circumstances in 
which liability would not otherwise arise.7  To take a simple exam­
ple, in the absence of a fiduciary duty a shareholder may purchase 
shares from a co-shareholder without disclosing material informa­
tion known to the buyer but not known to the seller.8  Fiduciary 
duty changes that.9 
Donahue and Wilkes are each cases that could have reached 
the same conclusions on narrower grounds.  In the case of Dona-
hue, the court could have decided that the directors who authorized 
the repurchase had a conflict of interest and thus bore the burden 
of proving that their decision was fair to the corporation.10  While 
this may not have given plaintiff all she sought in the case, a remand 
would have given her leverage for a favorable settlement and, in the 
future, inhibited those controlling a corporation from favoring the 
interests of related stockholders.  In Wilkes, the court could have 
ruled that the parties had a contractual understanding that they 
would all be directors, officers, and employees of the company, an 
understanding breached by the defendants.11  Alternatively, the 
court could have ruled that the payments to the defendants were at 
least partially constructive dividends in which the plaintiff should 
have shared.  But, as in Donahue, these rulings might not have 
given the plaintiff all he sought and, perhaps more importantly, 
would have precluded the broad doctrinal change made by these 
precedents. 
7. Id. at 417. 
8. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (“[A] purchaser of 
stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither an insider nor a 
fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to reveal material facts.”); see also Gen. 
Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968). 
9. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987); Van Schaack 
Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 898 (Colo. 1994); Bailey v. Vaughan, 359 
S.E.2d 599, 605 (W. Va. 1987). 
10. E.g., Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 819 (2009) (“Where a fiduciary is 
taking advantage of an opportunity for his own profit, he has the burden to show that 
all material facts were disclosed and that his actions did not harm the corporation and 
were fundamentally fair.” (citing Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts. Inc., 677 N.E.2d 
159, 180 (1997))). 
11. Wilkes, in his appellate brief, argued that the parties had a pre-incorporation 
agreement regarding the respective roles of the parties and their compensation. Wilkes 
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 n.2 (Mass. 1976). This agree­
ment, he argued, gave the parties fiduciary duties that continued on regardless of the 
form of the type of business entity that they formed. See id. at 659. 
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These two holdings, thus, are widely recognized as changing 
corporate law.12  To what extent is this assessment accurate? What 
was the state of the law when Wilkes and Donahue were decided? 
Were these decisions part of an activist streak by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, or aberrational to its jurisprudence? Did 
the decisions stimulate legislative action, or retard it? This Article 
seeks to answer, at least preliminarily, these questions, proceeding 
first, in Part I, with an analysis of the precedent and other authority 
supporting and undermining the decisions.  Part II then considers 
the nature of the court at the time of these decisions, looking briefly 
at other significant precedents decided by the court.  Part III re­
views statutory provisions dealing with minority shareholders and 
Part IV considers other post-1975 developments in business associa­
tion law. 
I. PRECEDENT CITED BY THE COURT 
Donahue was a precedent-setting decision and, unsurprisingly, 
the court cited no authority for the key holding in the case13: 
The rule of equal opportunity in stock purchases by close 
corporations provides equal access to these benefits for all stock­
holders.  We hold that, in any case in which the controlling stock­
holders have exercised their power over the corporation to deny 
the minority such equal opportunity, the minority shall be enti­
tled to appropriate relief.14 
The court cited no precedent for the first sentence, and for the 
second included a footnote explaining that “[e]ven under the tradi­
tional standard of duty applicable to corporate directors and stock­
holders generally, this court has looked favorably upon stockholder 
12. See, e.g., ROBERT  HAMILTON, CASES AND  MATERIALS ON  CORPORATIONS 
482 (8th ed. 2003) (“The basic holding of Donahue that fiduciary relationships exist 
within closely held corporations has been widely cited and accepted.  Courts in more 
than 25 states have either cited Donahue approvingly or have cited cases that relied 
upon Donahue for this proposition.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fis­
chel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 293-95 (1986) (call­
ing Donahue a “much applauded” decision). 
13. This holding was foreshadowed earlier in the opinion: “[I]f the stockholder 
whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling 
stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity 
to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.”  Donahue 
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975). The court did not cite any 
authority for this statement, but did indicate in a footnote that stockholders could give 
advance consent to a selective repurchase or could ratify it after the fact. Id. at 518 
n.24. 
14. Id. at 519. 
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challenges to stock issues which, in violation of a fiduciary duty, 
served personal interests of other stockholder/directors and did not 
serve the corporate interest.”15  Of course, stock issuances can oc­
cur only upon the approval of the board of directors, who must act 
in the best interests of the corporation.16 Donahue extends this 
concept because it requires those controlling the corporation to act 
in the personal interest of an individual stockholder, not just in the 
corporate interest.17  Under Donahue, if a stock repurchase from a 
controlling stockholder is in the best interests of the corporation, 
and a repurchase from a minority stockholder is not, the equal op­
portunity rule mandates the second repurchase, if that stockholder 
desires to sell.18  In that sense, Donahue stands traditional fiduciary 
duty on its head, at least for directors seeking to act in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
Donahue and, therefore, Wilkes, did rely on four earlier Mas­
sachusetts cases to support the principle that stockholders control­
ling a closely held corporation are to be held “to a standard of 
fiduciary duty more exacting than the traditional good faith and in­
herent fairness standard.”19  The earliest of these was Silversmith v. 
Sydeman,20 which the Donahue court characterized as implying 
that a stockholder-officer liquidating a corporation would be sub­
ject to “a more rigorous standard of fiduciary duty”21 in light of the 
fact that there were only two stockholders who acted as “partners” 
in the conduct and liquidation of the corporation.22  But the actual 
holding in Silversmith was unaffected by this observation; the de­
fendant breached his duty of loyalty and good faith regardless of 
how his relationship with his co-owner was characterized.23  While 
15. Id. at 519 n.25 (emphasis added).  The court cited as examples L. E. Fosgate 
Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 175 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1931); Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450 
(Mass. 1907); cf. Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 90 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 
1950). Id. 
16. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(b); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, 744 
F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984). 
17. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19. 
18. Id. at 519. 
19. Id. at 516. 
20. Silversmith v. Sydeman, 25 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1940). 
21. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (citing Silversmith, 25 N.E.2d at 68) (discussing 
how the relationship between the stockholders was like a partnership and despite the 
fact that the parties “had adopted [the] corporate form” to conduct their business, they 
would be held to the same fiduciary duty standard as the partners). 
22. Id. 
23. Silversmith, 25 N.E.2d at 217.  The defendant, essentially, paid himself com­
pensation and charged the corporation interest on a note, in each case without proper 
authorization. Id. at 217. 
343 
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the case did include dictum to the effect that “the plaintiff and de­
fendant were acting as partners,”24 this was more a factual observa­
tion than a legal conclusion and, in any event, was irrelevant to the 
holding in the case.25  Similarly, in Samia v. Central Oil Co.,26 the 
second case cited by the Donahue court,27 the defendants engaged 
in acts of self-dealing and breach of trust that justified recovery by 
the plaintiffs regardless of the size of the corporation.28  Indeed, 
some of the acts were outside the corporation, such as one defen­
dant’s improper acts as the executor of an estate.29  The court in 
Donahue cited to its Samia dictum that the corporation there was a 
small family corporation, but, again, this observation did not influ­
ence the outcome of the case.30 
The third case cited by the Donahue court was Sher v. San-
dler,31 which, tellingly, was not discussed by the court.32  In it, one 
stockholder in a two-person corporation purchased the stock of the 
other without disclosing material information known to the buyer 
but not the seller.33  The seller was successful in a suit for rescission 
because the buyer failed to disclose the information.34  The buyer’s 
disclosure obligation, however, arose because of an express contract 
between the parties that required each to keep the other fully in­
formed of “all transactions relating to the business,”35 a fact that 
the Sher court acknowledged.36 
The final cited case, which also was not discussed by the 
court,37 was Mendelsohn v. Leather Manufacturing Corp. and, like 
Sher, involved the sale of stock from one stockholder in a closely 
held corporation to another.38  And, as in Sher, there was an allega­
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 217, 220. 
26. Samia v. Cent. Oil Co., 158 N.E.2d 469 (Mass. 1959). 
27. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (citing Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 469). 
28. Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 476. 
29. Id. 
30. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517 (citing Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 476). 
31. Sher v. Shandler, 90 N.E.2d 536 (Mass. 1950). 
32. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517. 
33. Sher, 90 N.E.2d at 538.  This information concerned the fact that negotiations 
to conclude a lease favorable to the corporation were near completion and would en­
hance the corporation’s value. Id. 
34. Id. at 540. 
35. Id. at 537. 
36. Id. at 539 (“It was the defendant’s duty, under the agreement referred to 
above, to disclose all information necessary to enable the plaintiff to form a sound judg­
ment of the value of the interest that he was selling.” (emphasis added)). 
37. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517. 
38. Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 93 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Mass. 1950). 
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tion that the buyer failed to make full disclosure to the seller.39  The 
court seemed to acknowledge that the buyer owed duties of disclo­
sure to the seller,40 but this was dictum because the seller also sub­
sequently signed a general release at a time in which he appeared to 
be fully informed of all material facts.41  Without the release, the 
plaintiff-seller might still have prevailed because the buyer was an 
officer and director of the corporation, and that circumstance pre­
cluded the buyer from purchasing shares from an outside stock­
holder without disclosing material, nonpublic information.42  But it 
is the buyer’s status as a corporate insider that gives rise to the dis­
closure obligation, not the fact that the corporation is closely held. 
In short, then, the supporting authority for the holding in 
Donahue was weak, at best.  In contrast, existing Massachusetts 
precedent, which denied that stockholders in closely held 
corporations owed one another a fiduciary duty, suggested a 
contrary result, as the court readily acknowledged.43  And prece­
39. Id. at 540-41. 
40. Id. at 542 (“The mere absence of affirmative false representations, of course, 
would not preclude the plaintiff [seller] from impeaching the transaction.  By reason of 
the fiduciary relationship existing between the parties [the buyer] could be guilty of 
fraud by failing to disclose to the plaintiff relevant facts concerning the operations of 
the enterprise.”); see also Sher, 90 N.E.2d at 539-40; Akin v. Warner, 63 N.E.2d 566, 570 
(Mass. 1945); Reed v. A.E. Little, 152 N.E. 918, 920 (Mass. 1926); Flynn v. Colbert, 146 
N.E. 784, 786 (Mass. 1925); Arnold v. Maxwell, 111 N.E. 687, 689 (Mass. 1916). 
41. Mendelsohn, 90 N.E.2d at 542-43. 
42. Id. at 541.  This is the so-called “special fact doctrine,” which creates an ex­
ception to the general rule that the buyer has no duty to disclose and is imposed when 
the buyer is a corporate insider in possession of material nonpublic information and the 
seller is an outsider unaware of the information.  Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 
(1909). 
43. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517 (Mass. 1975) (citing 
Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 1952) (“Statements in other cases . . . which 
suggest that stockholders of a corporation do not stand in a relationship of trust and 
confidence to one another will not be followed in the close corporation context.” (cita­
tions omitted)); Leventhal v. Atlantic Fin. Corp., 55 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1944); Mairs v. 
Madden, 30 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1940)). 
Cardullo arose out of a sale by defendant of his 50% stock ownership in the corpo­
ration to the plaintiff, who was a 50% owner at the time of the sale. Cardullo, 105 
N.E.2d at 844.  Plaintiff complained that the defendant failed to disclose what defen­
dant had paid for the shares and that a general release, previously executed by the 
plaintiff, should not bar his claim. Id.  The court said that plaintiff’s claim rested on 
finding a fiduciary duty from the defendant to the plaintiff because the release was 
“very comprehensive.” Id. at 845.  The relationship of the parties, as co-owners of a 
firm, was insufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty between them. Id. at 846. 
In Leventhal, one of two stockholders in a two-stockholder corporation brought a 
suit in equity for interpretation of a contract between the two stockholders. Leventhal, 
55 N.E.2d at 22.  For reasons that are not articulated in the opinion, plaintiff argued that 
the contract created a partnership, and this was rejected by the court. Id.  The court 
345 
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dent from outside of Massachusetts also ran counter to 
Donahue.44 
Early in the opinion, the Donahue court cited and quoted from 
a 1957 federal district court case from the District of Columbia, 
Helms v. Duckworth,45 to support the idea that a closely held cor­
poration should be treated differently from corporations with a 
larger stockholder base.46 Helms, which was widely cited in the 
treatises and articles that the Donahue court relied upon, involved 
a buy/sell agreement in a two-person corporation.47  The agreement 
provided that upon the death of either stockholder, the survivor 
would buy the decedent’s shares at the price designated in the 
found that “[i]t was the intention of all the parties that the corporation should continue 
to conduct its business as a corporation.” Id. 
In Mairs, the defendants purchased outstanding stock and thereby gained control. 
Mairs, 30 N.E.2d at 244-46.  These purchases were made by the defendants while, as 
directors, they were negotiating with a third party who was seeking to acquire control of 
the corporation. Id.  The defendants’ purchase had the effect of mooting the third 
party’s offer, since it was conditioned on obtaining control. Id.  Plaintiffs complained 
that the defendants’ actions deprived them of the opportunity to tender their shares to 
the third party and, as control now rested with defendants, the value of plaintiffs’ stock 
was impaired. Id.  The court denied relief, partially on the basis that the defendants, as 
stockholders, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs. Id. 
44. E.g., Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1953) (“‘To warrant the 
interposition of the court in favor of the minority shareholders . . . , where such action is 
within the corporate powers, a case must be made out which plainly shows that such 
action is so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the 
clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire 
to secure such interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some 
outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company, and in a manner in­
consistent with its interests.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gamble v. Queens Cnty. 
Water Co., 25 N.E. 201, 202 (Mass. 1890))); Keck v. Schumacher, 198 So. 2d 39, 43 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (denying minority stockholder’s claim for dissolution despite her 
termination as an employee of the corporation); Hyman v. Velsicol, 97 N.E.2d 122, 124 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (holding that reorganization adversely affecting minority stock­
holder would be upheld because it was in the corporation’s interest that it proceed); 
Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 285 N.W. 809, 820 (Minn. 1953) (“While stockholders in a 
corporation owe the duty of good faith to each other in the management of the affairs 
of the corporation, they do not stand to each other in a fiduciary relation within the rule 
we have stated.” (quoting Bjorngaard v. Goodhue Cnty. Bank, 52 N.W. 48, 49 (Minn. 
1892))); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (noting, in dictum, 
that terminating the employment of a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation 
can result in hardship, but adding that “[n]evertheless, such situations do not in them­
selves form a ground for the interposition of a court of equity”); Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d 
231, 234 (R.I. 1964) (holding that in dealing in corporate shares, shareholders can act in 
their own self-interests). 
45. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
46. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511-13. 
47. Helms, 249 F.2d at 483. 
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agreement.48  Although the agreement contemplated that the price 
would be adjusted periodically by written consent, no such written 
modification was ever executed.49  The administratrix petitioner ar­
gued that the stock was worth considerably more than the price 
specified in the agreement and enforcement would be unfair.50  The 
court found that in a two-person venture such as this, there was a 
relationship of trust between the stockholders and each had to deal 
with each other fairly, honestly, and openly in order for the organi­
zation to survive.51  Accordingly, the court held that the surviving 
shareholder had a duty to bargain under the purchase agreement in 
good faith.52 Helms does support the notion that stockholders in a 
closely held corporation must deal with one another in good faith, 
but that good faith notion applies with equal force to all contractual 
obligations.53  Normal contract doctrines of interpretation and good 
faith might have resulted in the same outcome.54 
Like Donahue, Wilkes rested on a thin reed.  It relied heavily, 
of course, on Donahue and, like Donahue, proceeded from the as­
sumption that stockholders in a closely held corporation owed one 
another partner-like fiduciary duties.55  But Wilkes cut back slightly 
on Donahue, affording the controlling stockholders who have dis­
advantaged the minority stockholder the opportunity to demon­
strate that their actions had “a legitimate business purpose.”56  If 
they do so, “it is [up] to minority stockholders to demonstrate that 
the same legitimate objective could have been achieved though an 
48. Id. at 484. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 487. 
52. Id. at 486. 
53. Id.; see U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(1981). 
54. See generally Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Con­
tract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
559, 581 (2006) (“[E]ven where no statutory authority exists to vary the ‘plain meaning’ 
of contract language, courts will do so based on common law principles of interpreta­
tion and gap-filling where such language is clearly at odds with parties’ expectations.”). 
Professor Dubroff discusses the well-known Massachusetts case of Spaulding v. Morris, 
76 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1947), where the court quoted from an earlier Massachusetts case 
that announced a broad rule of interpretation: “‘Every instrument in writing is to be 
interpreted, with a view to the material circumstances of the parties at the time of the 
execution, in the light of the pertinent facts within their knowledge and in such manner 
as to give effect to the main end designed to be accomplished.’” Id. (quoting Dit­
temore v. Dickey, 144 N.E. 57, 60 (Mass. 1924)). 
55. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-64 (Mass. 
1976). 
56. Id. at 663. 
347 
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alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s inter­
est.”57  For both of these propositions, the Wilkes court cited a New 
York case, Schwartz v. Marien,58 and for the first proposition the 
court also cited a federal district court case from Georgia, Bryan v. 
Brock & Blevins Co.59 
Schwartz v. Marien does indeed support the proposition that 
when the board of directors takes an action that disadvantages a 
minority stockholder, it bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
had a “bona fide business purpose” that served the “best interests 
of the corporation.”60 Schwartz also suggested that, under the cir­
cumstances of that case, even if the board could demonstrate such a 
purpose, it must also demonstrate that “such objective could not 
have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other 
means” which did not adversely affect the complaining minority 
stockholder.61 
Schwartz, however, was not grounded on the notion that the 
stockholders should be considered as fiduciaries of one another like 
partners in a partnership.  Rather, this was a case in which the di­
rectors, acting in their respective capacities as directors, authorized 
the issuance of stock to themselves that resulted in a change of con­
trol.62  Prior to the issuance, the plaintiff owned 50% of the out­
standing common stock, and a second family owned the other 
50%.63  Members of the second family controlled the board that 
authorized the stock issuance that gave them control.64  Under uni­
versally accepted principles of corporate governance, the defend­
ants, as directors, owed the corporation a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the corporation and, when their actions bene­
fited them personally, they bore a heavy burden to demonstrate the 
fairness of their actions.65  The New York court’s decision in 
Schwartz v. Marien is just an application of this general principle 
and, as such, it stands in contrast to Wilkes.66  In Wilkes, the de­
57. Id. 
58. Id.; see Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975). 
59. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; see Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. 
Ga. 1972), aff’d 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974). 
60. Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 338. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 336. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.; see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 
A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962). 
66. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 338, with Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976). 
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fendants also acted in their capacity as stockholders when they de­
clined to reelect Wilkes to the Springside board,67 and therein lies 
the radicalism of the Wilkes decision.  It limits the ability of stock­
holders, acting as stockholders, to act in their own interests, instead 
burdening them with vague and unspecified duties to their fellow 
stockholders. 
Schwartz does bear a resemblance to Donahue but is distin­
guishable from it.  Both cases involve actions of the board of direc­
tors dealing in corporate stock—in Schwartz an issuance and in 
Donahue a repurchase.68  In both cases, the minority stockholder 
complained of being precluded from participating, to their disad­
vantage.69  There is, however, a subtle, but important, difference in 
the cases.  In Schwartz, the action of the directors benefited them 
personally in their ability to control the corporation, but in Dona-
hue the directors did not benefit personally.70  One member of their 
family had his shares redeemed, but the defendant directors did not 
receive the proceeds of the redemption.71  Indeed, the relative own­
ership percentages of the remaining stockholders, including the 
plaintiff, increased.72  While Schwartz, Wilkes, and Donahue are 
certainly not inconsistent with one another, Donahue and Wilkes 
represent an important extension of Schwartz. 
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.73 is even weaker authority for 
the proposition that the controlling group must demonstrate a legit­
imate business purpose for its actions.  In Bryan, the plaintiff, a 
15% stockholder in a closely held corporation, sought to enjoin a 
squeeze-out merger that would convert his stock ownership interest 
to cash.74  He brought his action under Rule 10b-5.75  The defend­
ants had told the plaintiff that the company had decided to acquire 
his stock because of “a longstanding company policy” to limit share 
ownership to “active stockholders” and since plaintiff had retired 
he was no longer “active.”76  But the court was unconvinced that 
67. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661. 
68. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510 (Mass. 1975). 
69. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
70. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
71. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
72. Id. 
73. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1063 (citing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Employment of Ma­
nipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964)). 
76. Id. at 1064. 
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this was, in fact, the company’s policy and, therefore, the merger 
lacked a “business purpose.”77  The decision is less than a model of 
clarity and the court never held that a merger lacking a business 
purpose violates Rule 10b-5.78  Moreover, the court acknowledged 
that “in the absence of fraudulent activity in the merger proceed­
ings, the defendants’ position [that they need not demonstrate a 
business purpose] is conceivably supported by law.”79  The court 
went on to find such fraudulent activity—the defendants failed to 
disclose certain information regarding the company’s expansion 
plans.80 
The case does include dicta supporting the holding in Wilkes, 
including an assertion that the merger could “hardly be interpreted 
to have been made in the best interest of [the plaintiff] as a minor­
ity shareholder.”81  Ultimately, however, this is case about fraud, 
not fiduciary duty.82 Bryan was decided during a period in which 
the legality of squeeze-out mergers was being actively litigated in 
the federal and state courts, the former under Rule 10b-5 and the 
latter under state fiduciary principles.83  With respect to the former, 
the United States Supreme Court ultimately held that Rule 10b-5 
was limited to manipulative and deceptive devices and contriv­
ances, and a mere breach of fiduciary duty unaccompanied by a 
misrepresentation or misleading statement would not support an 
action under the Rule.84  As to state claims, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held in 1977 that a squeeze-out merger not motivated by a 
legitimate business purpose was a breach of the directors’ fiduciary 
duty.85  Six years later, however, that court reversed course and 
held that such a merger was permissible, but the board of directors 
had the burden of proving that such a merger was “entirely fair”— 
in terms of price and process—to the minority shareholders.86 
While not all state courts agree with this latter Delaware decision,87 
77. Id. at 1068. 
78. See id. 
79. Id. at 1067. 
80. Id. at 1069. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1067. 
83. See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate 
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1355 (1978) (describing and explaining how “litigation in 
the freezeout field ha[d] become exceedingly active during the past ten years”). 
84. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). 
85. Singer v. Magnavox Co. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). 
86. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
87. Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1116­
17 (Mass. 1986). 
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it seems fair to conclude that most courts would. The bottom line is 
that Bryan was of questionable authority when decided and clearly 
is no longer of any precedential value. 
In short, then, Wilkes was, at the least, a generous extension of 
the precedent cited by the court and, more accurately, a break from 
it.  Other cases, however, not cited by the Donahue or Wilkes 
courts, do point in the direction of finding a fiduciary duty among 
stockholders,88 and academic literature roughly contemporaneous 
with Donahue and Wilkes,89 particularly work by F. Hodge 
O’Neal,90 built on those cases to provide strong support for the 
88. E.g., Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1961) 
(upholding trial court’s ordering the equitable remedy of liquidation where a pattern of 
conduct by the dominant stockholders was seriously prejudicial to the rights and inter­
ests of the minority); Hartung v. Architects Hartung/Odle/Burke, Inc., 301 N.E.2d 240, 
243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (“[T]he shareholders in a close corporation, also referred to as 
an ‘incorporated partnership,’ stand in a fiduciary relationship to each another.”); 
Fewell v. Tappan, 27 N.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Minn. 1947) (holding that claims for fraud 
and bad faith would be considered in light of an expectation of loyalty drawn from 
partnership principles); Application of Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 715 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (drawing on partnership principles to determine whether a dissolu­
tion of the corporation would be beneficial to the stockholders); Gaines v. Long Mfg. 
Co., 67 S.E.2d 350, 353-55 (N.C. 1951) (analogizing the duty of a controlling stockholder 
to that of a trustee and holding that an injunction was proper where minority stock­
holder had no adequate remedy at law to address allegedly harmful issuance of stock by 
the corporation); Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339, 343 (Or. 1967) 
(finding squeeze out accomplished by issuance of shares was illegal; case remanded for 
appropriate remedy). 
89. See, e.g., F. O’NEAL, CLOSE  CORPORATIONS: LAW AND  PRACTICE (2d ed. 
1971); F. O’NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); F. O’NEAL & J. 
DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1961); see also Allen 
B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for 
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (1969); Edwin J. Bradley, A Comparative Assess­
ment of the California Close Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Indi­
vidual Participants, 9 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 865, 866 (1976) [hereinafter Comparative 
Assessment]; Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation—The Need 
for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1147 (1966) [hereinafter To­
wards a More Perfect Close Corporation]; Michael W. Carnahan, Relief to Oppressed 
Minorities in Close Corporations:  Partnership Precepts and Related Considerations, 
1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 420; Gaston H. Gage, Close Corporations—Bad Faith of Major­
ity, 35 N.C. L. REV. 271, 279 (1957); Comment, Minority Rights and the Corporate 
“Squeeze” and “Freeze,” 1959 DUKE L.J. 436. In a symposium in the Northwestern 
Law Review devoted to close corporations, one author concluded a discussion of mi­
nority shareholders with this advice: “[I]t seems that the minority’s rights should be 
enlarged to some extent, so that the legal tools which are placed in the hands of the 
majority cannot be used as instruments of oppression.”  Symposium, The Close Corpo­
ration, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 396 (1957). 
90. O’Neal, a recognized authority on closely held corporations, joined the 
faculty of the Washington University School of Law in 1977, was dean from 1980 to 
1985, and was the George Alexander Madill Professor of Law when he retired in 1988. 
Obituaries, F. Hodge O’Neal, 73, Ex-Law School Dean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at 
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Massachusetts court.  O’Neal produced a treatise of over 600 pages 
devoted to the plight of minority shareholders in closely held corpo­
rations entitled Oppression of Minority Shareholders.91  The trea­
tise has an unmistakable agenda—to identify the various ways that 
minority shareholders are squeezed out of a corporation and to sug­
gest legal theories and planning techniques to address the 
problem.92 
O’Neal’s treatise is as creative as it is thorough. For instance, 
in the course of discussing the Wilkes problem (“§ 3.06 Eliminating 
minority shareholders from directorate and excluding them from 
company employment”), O’Neal advises: “if [a shareholder who is 
dismissed from employment] has a cause of action against the ma­
jority shareholders . . . based on oppressive acts they have commit­
ted other than his discharge, he may be able to strengthen his case 
by using his arbitrary dismissal to evidence their bad faith.”93 
O’Neal promoted the idea that controlling shareholders owe 
fiduciary duties to the minority, calling the contrary view “outmo­
ded.”94  More importantly in the discussion of Donahue and Wilkes, 
O’Neal argued for partnership duties among shareholders,95 charac­
terizing a Wilkes-type squeeze out as “unjust.”96  He concluded his 
treatise with a call to the judiciary and legislatures to take steps “to 
prevent the oppression of minority shareholders who lacked either 
the foresight or bargaining power to provide adequate protection 
for themselves.”97  A few pages later he called for greater judicial 
activism: 
Even in the absence of a statute specifically conferring broad 
powers on the courts to provide relief in shareholder disputes, 
there is no reason why the courts themselves should not be more 
energetic and imaginative in developing effective remedies for 
majority oppression of minorities.  On the whole, American 
courts have been singularly conservative and unresourceful in 
providing remedies for oppressed minority shareholders.98 
D23.  Earlier he had taught at the University of Mississippi and Vanderbilt University 
and had been dean of the law schools at Mercer and Duke. Id.  He died in 1991 at the 
age of 73. Id. 
91. F. HODGE O’NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975). 
92. Id. at 1. 
93. Id. at 80. 
94. Id. at 508. 
95. Id. at 508-28. 
96. Id. at 526. 
97. Id. at 582. 
98. Id. at 587-88 
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Clearly, the Massachusetts court in Donahue and Wilkes took 
up the call. 
Interestingly, O’Neal failed to give serious consideration to any 
counter-argument to judicial intervention.99  For instance, where 
the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme of regulation, 
is it appropriate for the courts to intervene?100  Does judicial inter­
vention upset an implicit bargain that the parties have made?  Is 
judicial intervention a more efficient way to protect minority stock­
holders than legislative action?101  Are courts well equipped to re­
fashion the bargain that the parties have made?  Such questions 
may have caused other courts to eschew the Donahue/Wilkes ap­
proach to close corporations and defer to the legislature.102  In any 
event, O’Neal and other commentators at that time demonstrate 
zealotry on the issue that is apparent in the Massachusetts decisions 
as well. 
II. THE COURT 
The Donahue/Wilkes decisions must be considered with refer­
ence to the jurists who wrote the opinions and in the context of 
other decisions of the Massachusetts Court at or around the same 
time.  Both the Donahue and Wilkes opinions were written by 
99. Professor Harry Henn, however, did express the view that a private, contract 
solution might be preferable. HARRY  HENN, LAW OF  CORPORATIONS § 258, at 512 
(1970).  Henn did not seem to see a dire problem in the existing remedies for squeezed-
out shareholders, stating, “Ingeniousness on the part of counsel in drafting arrange­
ments for the formation and operation of close corporations has, notwithstanding lack 
of statutory and judicial differentiation, enabled close corporations to achieve most of 
their legitimate objects thereby rendering the present situation tolerable to numerous 
small business corporations.” Id. 
100. Some commentators did seem concerned with this question. See Compara­
tive Assessment, supra note 89, at 895-96; Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation, 
supra note 89, at 1145-46; see also Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Busi­
ness Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 484 (1985) 
(discussing the business judgment rule and other judicially created substitutes). 
101. Around the time of the Donahue/Wilkes decisions commentators were advo­
cating for legislative solutions. See, e.g., Afterman, supra note 89, at 1076-77; Toward a 
More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 89, at 1145; F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corpo­
rations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 881 (1978) 
(summarizing developments in close corporation law and suggesting additional legisla­
tion that would be desirable). 
102. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993); Cookies Food 
Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1988); Pabich 
v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. App. 2002); see also Siegel, supra note 6, at 427- R 
28 (discussing jurisdictions that have eschewed the legal principles represented by 
Wilkes/Donahue). 
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Chief Justices of the Court.103  Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro, au­
thor of Donahue, presided from 1970 to 1976104 and Chief Justice 
Edward J. Hennessey, author of Wilkes, presided from 1976 to 
1989.105  Both justices earned reputations for persuasive writing, 
thorough research, and careful case analysis attuned to individual 
facts, but were also seen as “progressive,” overseeing fundamental 
changes in many aspects of Massachusetts state law.106 
Justice Tauro brought to the court a diverse professional career 
and broad experience.  Born in 1909 to poor Italian immigrants,107 
he had been a general practitioner and trial lawyer for more than 
three decades, Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor, and, at the 
time of his nomination, Chief Justice of the Superior Court, the 
state’s highest trial court.108  He had also been an active participant 
in the business and civic affairs of his community and a leader in 
professional organizations.109  This practice-oriented background 
may explain why he was so willing to re-examine long-standing 
precedents and abandon them in favor of more progressive posi­
tions.110  In Donahue, for example, he eschewed a traditional analy­
103. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 657, 657 (Mass. 1976); 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 505 (Mass. 1976). 
104. SUPREME  JUDICIAL  COURT OF  MASSACHUSETTS  OFFICE OF  REPORTER OF 
DECISIONS, JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (1804-PRESENT), available at 
http://www.massreports.com/justices/AllJustices.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
105. Id. 
106. See, e.g., Honorable John M. Greaney, Dedication, Dedication to Honorable 
Edward F. Hennessey, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. xxv, xxv (1990).  Greaney observed that 
Chief Justice Hennessey had “the courage to break from precedent where changing 
societal values and conditions call[ed] for a new rule of law. . . . [Chief Justice Hennes­
sey] adhered to the philosophy that stability in the law was important but should never 
supplant the need for judges to exercise their ‘creative powers’ to fashion, whenever 
necessary, thoughtful answers to difficult human problems.” Id.; see also Justice Benja­
min Kaplan, Address to a Special Sitting of the Supreme Judicial Court: Memorial to the 
Late Justice Robert Braucher, 387 Mass. 1223, 1226, 1230 (1982) (commenting on Justice 
Braucher, Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1971 to 
1981: “[i]n a community of professed liberals, Bob pronounced himself a 
conservative”). 
107. Obituaries, G. Joseph Tauro, Was Chief Justice of SJC and Superior Court, 
BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 18. 
108. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, 61 MASS. L. Q. 19, 19 (1976). 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning 
common law distinctions between licensees, visitors, guests, etc. in favor of a single 
“common duty of reasonable care”); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 296 
N.E.2d 461, 465 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning the doctrine of sovereign immunity when 
government creates or maintains a private nuisance); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 
293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning common law doctrine that a tenant’s 
obligation to pay rent is based solely upon his possession of the premises); George v. 
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sis under corporate law, favored by the lower court,111 and instead 
recognized a broad doctrine of protecting the expectations of mi­
nority stockholders. 
At the time of Tauro’s nomination, the Supreme Judicial Court 
was overburdened with an unworkably high caseload.112  Within 
two years of his appointment, Chief Justice Tauro oversaw the es­
tablishment of a brand new intermediate appellate system.113  The 
new appellate court was “the most significant change in the organi­
zation of the Massachusetts court system” in over a century.114  Af­
ter its establishment, Tauro wrote, “the appellate burdens on the 
Supreme Judicial Court have been eased somewhat, thereby al­
lowing the justices to devote more time and study to the decision of 
those appeals presenting important legal issues of broad social im­
pact.”115  A survey of cases decided during Tauro’s tenure demon­
strates this progressive approach and the higher level of detail and 
research each justice employed to support the Court’s decisions. 
For example, Fiorentino v. Probate Court examined the consti­
tutionality under the equal protection clause of a statutory two-year 
residency requirement to file for divorce in Massachusetts and gen­
erated two persuasive opinions, one the majority and one the dis­
senting, presenting a detailed analysis of the issues and a 
comprehensive review of the existing state and constitutional 
law.116 Wilkes itself cites to a number of treatises and law review 
articles in addition to case law to support its holding.117  This new 
scholarly acumen was praised by the state’s bar journal, the Massa­
chusetts Law Quarterly, which wrote, “The day of terse, unrea­
soned, unanimous declaration of the law from on high is apparently 
over.  The day of the carefully, even meticulously exhibited reason­
ing process underlying the final result . . . is thankfully before 
us.”118 
Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1971) (allowing recovery for the inflic­
tion of emotional distress not caused by the commission of a common law tort). 
111. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1976) (stating 
that the lower court had used corporate standards to find “that the purchase was with­
out prejudice to the plaintiff and implicitly found that the transaction had been carried 
out in good faith and with inherent fairness”). 
112. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, supra note 108, at 21. R 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. G. Joseph Tauro, The State of the Judiciary-Annual Report of Chief Justice, 
60 MASS. L. Q. 241, 251 (1975). 
116. Fiorentino v. Prob. Ct., 310 N.E.2d 112, 112, 121-22 (Mass. 1974). 
117. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
118. Case and Statute Comments, 59 MASS. L. Q. 175, 180 (1974). 
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Overall, Tauro championed modernization in all facets of the 
judicial system he inherited.  He advocated for new courthouse fa­
cilities, better trained trial attorneys, modern courthouse proce­
dures and management, and, most importantly, modernization of 
the civil law of the state.119  On this latter problem, he strongly be­
lieved in judicial independence and wrote, “When dealing with a 
rule of law originally established by judicial decision I believe that 
its change, when required, should come by means of a judicial deci­
sion.  In these circumstances, I do not believe that we should look 
to the Legislature for change.”120  Since the existence and scope of 
the fiduciary relationship was traditionally developed by courts of 
equity, and since the application of fiduciary principles in corporate 
contexts had likewise been developed by judicial decision,121 it is 
not hard to connect Tauro’s judicial philosophies with Donahue and 
other progressive decisions marked by the “Tauro Era”122 of Mas­
sachusetts jurisprudence. 
The activism of the Supreme Judicial Court during the Tauro 
Era is manifest in a number of decisions.123  For example, in Gau­
dette v. Webb, the court created a new common law cause of action 
for wrongful death in an area already the subject of legislation, 
overruling five prior Massachusetts decisions that held the area 
119. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, supra note 108, at 21 R 
120. Lombardo v. D. F. Frangioso & Co., 269 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Mass. 1971) 
(Tauro, C.J., dissenting). 
121. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) 
(“To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further 
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?  In 
what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?  And what are the conse­
quences of his deviation from his duty?”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) 
(holding directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders); S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 
483, 487 (1919) (controlling majority has fiduciary relation to minority). 
122. Case and Statute Comments, 58 MASS. L. Q. 297, 327 (1973). 
123. The court’s progressive tendencies are also apparent in a number of deci­
sions.  For instance, in Opinion of Justices, 298 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1973), the court 
rendered an advisory opinion to the Governor that an anti-bussing bill then pending in 
the Massachusetts House of Representatives violated the equal protection clauses of 
the Constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts; in Board of Appeals of Hano­
ver v. Housing Appeals Committee in Department of Community Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 
393, 411 (Mass. 1973), the court made it much more difficult for municipalities to ex­
clude low income housing; and in Green v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxa­
tion, 305 N.E.2d 92, 95 (1973), the court held that a woman’s domicile for tax purposes 
was not necessarily that of her husband’s. But see Commonwealth v. Olivo, 337 N.E.2d 
904, 911 (Mass. 1975) (finding non-English speaking criminal defendant not entitled to 
have criminal complaint in Spanish); Commonwealth v. Ross, 296 N.E.2d 810, 816 
(Mass. 1973) (taking a narrow view of the extent to which a black defendant in a crimi­
nal trial could require the judge, conducting a voir dire, to inquire into a potential ju­
ror’s racial prejudice). 
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completely in the province of statute.124  In effect, the decision cre­
ated a common law right alongside the existing statutory recovery. 
In Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, Justice Quirico’s dis­
sent expressed the concern that the majority had gone too far in 
imposing a broad, sweeping, and undefined warranty of habitability 
on landlords.125  In Lewis v. Lewis, the court abolished the doctrine 
of interspousal immunity in claims arising out of automobile acci­
dents and held that the general principle of providing a remedy for 
an injury outweighed the state’s statutory prohibition against inter-
spousal suits.126  In Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co.  the court overruled 
longstanding precedent that denied a wife a claim against a negli­
gent tortfeasor for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to her 
husband.127  Finally, in Donahue, the court could have found for the 
minority shareholder based upon a breach of the defendants’ fiduci­
ary obligation as directors.128  Several existing Massachusetts deci­
sions would have supported this analysis,129 thus avoiding its 
judicially-created heightened fiduciary standard among close corpo­
ration stockholders. 
Overall, the judicial attitudes of both the Tauro and Hennessey 
Supreme Judicial Courts can be summarized as progressive with an 
eye towards modernization of the law and an adherence to the idea 
124. Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1971). 
125. Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 851 (Mass. 1973) (Quirico, 
J., dissenting). 
126. Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 527-32 (Mass. 1976). 
127. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 558, 562, 564 (Mass. 1973). 
128. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1975).  Put 
simply, the court could have ruled that through the buy-out the directors benefited 
indirectly or, for purposes of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, directors dealing with a 
family member have a conflict of interest. 
129. See, e.g., Anderson v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 90 N.E.2d 541, 544 
(Mass. 1950) (“Directors cannot take advantage of their official position to manipulate 
the issue and purchase of shares of the stock of the corporation in order to secure for 
themselves the control of the corporation and then to place the ownership of the stock 
in such a position as will perpetuate that control.  Such action constitutes a breach of 
their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and a wilful disregard of the rights of the 
other stockholders.”); L.E. Fosgate Co. v. Bos. Mkt. Terminal Co., 175 N.E. 86, 108 
(Mass. 1931) (“It is settled that the directors of a corporation cannot lawfully issue 
treasury stock to themselves or to a confederate for the purpose of gaining control of 
the corporation without giving the other stockholders an opportunity to subscribe.” (cit­
ing Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450 (Mass. 1907))); Elliott, 80 N.E. at 452 (“The directors 
of a corporation act in a strictly fiduciary capacity.  Their office is one of trust and they 
are held to the high standard of duty required of trustees. . . .  Corporate directors 
cannot manipulate the property, of which they have control in a trust [relation], prima­
rily with the intent to secure a majority of the stock or of directors in any particular 
interest.”). 
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of fundamental fairness.  The court was willing to take a fresh look 
at the rationale and application of the law in light of changing social 
and economic conditions.  Through numerous groundbreaking deci­
sions in torts,130 zoning and land use,131 corporations,132 criminal 
law,133 and more,134 the court saw that society was rapidly changing 
130. E.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975) (rec­
ognizing a cause of action on behalf of a fetus whose death was caused by a negligent 
injury to the mother); Pridgen v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467, 477 (Mass. 1974) 
(finding landowner liable for injuries to trespasser caused by nonfeasance); Diaz, 302 
N.E.2d at 564 (allowing wives, not just husbands, to bring a cause of action for loss of 
consortium); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 298 N.E.2d 847, 858-59 (Mass. 1973) (establishing 
new law that a public official acting in good faith and without malice or corruption is 
not liable to a private party for negligence or other error in making a decision within 
the scope of his authority); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 
1971) (establishing emotional distress as an actionable tort in Massachusetts). 
131. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 903 (Mass. 1974) (eminent do­
main case); Cameron v. Zoning Agent of Bellingham, 260 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Mass. 1970) 
(allowing different treatment of public housing units under town zoning laws); McNeely 
v. Bd. of Appeal of Bos., 261 N.E.2d 336, 345 (Mass. 1970) (holding a private university 
must comply with zoning regulations). 
132. In addition to Donahue and Wilkes, see Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. 
Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971), where the Court departed from the Model Penal Code 
and held that the position a person holds in a corporation is not the criterion for estab­
lishing corporate criminal liability.  The Code stated that a corporation was criminally 
liable only if the culpable activity “was performed, authorized, ratified, adopted or tol­
erated by the corporation’s directors, officers or other ‘high managerial agents.’” Id. at 
71-72 (quoting MODEL  PENAL  CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Final Draft 1962)). Rejecting 
this rule, the court held that liability would occur if “the corporation ha[d] placed [an] 
agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibility to act for and in 
behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate business, operation or 
project in which he was engaged at the time he committed the criminal act.” Id. at 86. 
In Petruzzi v. Peduka Constr. Inc., 285 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1972), the court enforced a 
vague corporate compensation agreement that was never reduced to writing or re­
flected in corporate minutes because of the nature of small corporations and the infor­
mality in which they are often run. 
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1975) (void­
ing Massachusetts’s mandatory death penalty for rape-murder on the principle that the 
right to life is fundamental and due process requires that the state bears the burden to 
demonstrate a compelling interest in execution that could not be served by any less 
restrictive means); Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 828 (Mass. 1973) (grant­
ing criminal defendants a “mandatory statutory right[ ]” to cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses and present testimony before a determination of probable cause at prelimi­
nary hearings); Commonwealth v. Henson, 259 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Mass. 1970) (looking 
to objective circumstances of the crime, and not defendant’s mens rea, in affirming con­
viction for assault with a dangerous weapon). 
134. See, e.g., A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 684-85 (Mass. 1976) 
(spelling out guidelines for transfer hearings that determine whether a juvenile offender 
should be tried as an adult); Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Att’y Gen., 326 N.E.2d 334, 
339 (Mass. 1975) (finding state attorney general may refuse to prosecute an appeal de­
spite request of governor to do so); Fiorentino v. Prob. Ct., 310 N.E.2d 112, 115, 121 
(Mass. 1974) (holding two-year statutory residency requirement for obtaining a divorce 
based on cause outside the state is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause). 
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and felt that existing common law precepts were no longer useful or 
applicable in remedying important issues.135  Also, perhaps due to 
the newly acquired luxury of more time for research and writing, 
the court’s opinions often moved to discussions of the law beyond 
the disposition of the issue of the case.136  This willingness to both 
extend existing law and fashion brand new law based on the practi­
cal realities of conflicts before it fits the reasoning and conclusions 
displayed in both Donahue and Wilkes.137 
III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROTECTING
 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
 
Remarkably, Massachusetts is among a minority of states 
whose corporate code provides no special protection for minority 
stockholders.138  This is particularly striking inasmuch as the Massa­
chusetts legislature adopted a substantially revised corporate code 
in 2004 modeled after the ABA’s revised Model Business Corpora­
tion Act (MBCA).139  The MBCA includes a provision, widely 
adopted,140 that authorizes a court to dissolve a corporation if “the 
135. In the Supreme Judicial Court–Tort–Common Law Wrongful Death Action 
Created, 57 Mass. L.Q. 293, 297 (1972); Cases & Statute Comments, 58 Mass. L.Q. 299, 
321 (1973). 
136. See, e.g., Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Mass. 
1973) (moving on from its holding on private nuisance to discuss the doctrine of sover­
eign immunity from tort liability generally); see also Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 
57 (Mass. 1973).  In response to the Court’s abolishment of the common law distinctions 
between invitees, licensees or trespassers, Justice Quirico’s partial dissent states, “I am 
unable to agree with the use of the present case as the vehicle for the promulgation of 
such a broad new rule of law which purports to have application beyond what I believe 
to be the scope and necessities of the present case.” Id. at 55.  Later, he writes: “The 
briefs and oral arguments before this court did not concern themselves with such a 
rule. . . .  If such a fundamental change in our law is otherwise desirable, it should more 
appropriately be accomplished in a case in which the issue is raised, in which the court 
has the benefit of briefs and arguments directed specifically thereto, and in which the 
court can better weigh and consider the far reaching implications and consequences of 
such a change.”  Id. at 57. 
137. See Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 53; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 
328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 
657, 657 (Mass. 1976). 
138. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, §§ 1.01-17.04 (2008). 
139. MODEL  BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii) (2007).  This provision has been 
adopted in some form by all fifty states. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (rev. 2009). 
The introduction to the new Massachusetts act stated that it “is the first comprehensive 
revision of the Massachusetts law governing business corporations in approximately 100 
years and is based on, but is not identical to, the American Bar Association’s Model 
Business Corporation Act.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, cmt. (2008). 
140. As of 2010, twenty-three states have adopted a provision modeled after the 
Model Business Corporation Act’s § 14.30(2)(ii). See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) 
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directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are act­
ing, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudu­
lent.”141  This provision has been interpreted fairly broadly in a 
number of courts, giving the judiciary considerable leverage to re­
quire those in control of a corporation to deal fairly with minority 
shareholders.142  According to an article that appeared in the Mas­
sachusetts Law Review, the drafters of the Massachusetts act had as 
a goal “to facilitate legislative adoption” and, apparently, achieving 
that goal required the “[n]on-disturbance of special Massachusetts 
close corporation jurisprudence (Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 
of New England and its progeny).”143  The predecessor Massachu­
setts corporate code also was silent on protecting minority stock­
holders.144  Thus, in Massachusetts it is fair to say that the statute 
contemplates a special role for the judiciary in terms of protecting 
minority stockholders. 
In contrast to Massachusetts, a number of states had various 
provisions protecting minority stockholders in the mid-1970s, when 
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1430 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1108 (2001); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-301 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-896 (2007); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 14-2-940 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-411 (LexisNexis 2008); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 30-1-1430 (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1430 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1430 
(2005); MISS. CODE  ANN. § 79-4-14.30 (West 2009 & Supp 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 351.494 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20, 
162 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 441-1203 
(West Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.661(2)(b), 60.952 (West 2009); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1430 (2007); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-24-301 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1430 (LexisNexis 2009); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11A, § 14.30 (1997). 
141. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii). 
142. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) (citing 
Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)) (adopting a “rea­
sonable expectations” interpretation of oppression under Alaska’s dissolution statute); 
Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 402, 404-05 (Colo. App. 2000) (interpreting 
Colorado’s oppression statute to be a “broad and flexible” tool that considers fiduciary 
duties owed to minority shareholders, reasonable shareholder expectations, and overall 
fairness); see also John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to 
Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 701-09 (2007) 
(providing a state-by-state survey of dissolution statutes and the judicial interpretation 
of those provisions).  Some courts have even recognized a right to judicial dissolution in 
the absence of a statute so providing. See, e.g., Leibert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540, 546 
(N.Y. 1963). 
143. Jerry Cohen & Jonathan C. Guest, Case and Statute Comment, The New 
Massachusetts Business Corporation Act, Chapter 127, Acts of 2003, 88 MASS. L. REV. 
213, 213 (2004). 
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, §§ 1-55. 
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Donahue and Wilkes were decided.145  The primary means of pro­
tection was the statute referred to above, giving the courts the 
power to dissolve the corporation if a minority shareholder could 
demonstrate “illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.”146  This 
provision has been a part of the Model Business Corporation Act 
since its first iteration in 1946.147  Other states, however, went be­
yond this simple dissolution provision. In 1972, New Jersey 
adopted provisions greatly enhancing the position of minority 
shareholders.  For instance, the courts were authorized to order 
remedies other than dissolution and, at the same time, the threshold 
for ordering dissolution was lowered: 
The Superior Court . . . may appoint a custodian, appoint a provi­
sional director, order a sale of the corporation’s stock as pro­
vided below, or enter a judgment dissolving the corporation, 
upon proof that . . . in the case of a corporation having 25 or less 
shareholders, the directors or those in control have acted fraudu­
lently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their 
authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or 
unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in their ca­
pacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees.148 
In 1975, the California legislature amended its corporate code 
to authorize the dissolution of a corporation when “[t]hose in con­
trol of the corporation have been guilty of or have knowingly coun­
tenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse 
of authority or persistent unfairness towards any shareholders.”149 
The prompting of O’Neal and others was having its affect on 
state legislatures;150 and the decisions in Donahue and Wilkes, if 
anything, spurred on this development.  In 1981, Minnesota began 
145. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to 17-7216 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
13A §§ 102(5), 701, 703 (1974) (repealed by ME. BUS. CORP. ACT c. 640 § A-1, 2001 
Me. Laws 1464, 1464); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1101-45-.1151 (West 2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(1)(c) (West 2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAWS § 620 (McKinney 
2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1999). 
146. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii). 
147. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 
BUS. LAW. 699, 711 (1993) (citing Report of the Committee on Corporation Law in 
Proceedings of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law at the 
Annual Meeting in Atlantic City, N.J. (Oct. 28-29, 1946)). 
148. New Jersey Business Corporation Act, ch. 366, 1973 N.J. LAWS 964, 1036-37 
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003)). 
149. Act effective January 1, 1977, ch. 683, 1975 CAL. STAT. 1514, 1597-98 (codi­
fied as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 2009)). 
150. See generally Matheson & Maler, supra note 142, at 662-74 (reviewing these R 
statutory developments). 
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down a path of greater protection for minority shareholders, first 
with a provision that authorized judicial dissolution for behavior 
“persistently unfair” to the minority151 and, two years later, for be­
havior that was merely “unfairly prejudicial.”152  The Minnesota 
law also authorized a court to order a buyout of a minority share­
holder, and, in considering whether to grant equitable relief, the 
court should consider the “reasonable expectations” of the com­
plaining shareholder.153  A few years later, the North Dakota legis­
lature passed a similar statute, again focusing on the “reasonable 
expectations” of the shareholders.154  Alaska155 and Oregon156 soon 
followed suit and, in 1990, the ABA amended the Model Business 
Corporation Act adding section 14.34.157  Under this section, if a 
shareholder of a closely held corporation has petitioned for dissolu­
tion under section 14.30(2), which includes a claim of oppression, 
the corporation or one or more shareholders may elect to purchase 
the shares of the petitioning shareholder at fair value.158 
IV.	 JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST 35 YEARS AND THE 
ADVENT OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
A. Judicial Developments Since 1975 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a complete or 
thorough analysis of the considerable number of cases involving the 
rights of minority shareholders over the past thirty-five years.  A 
few observations, however, are in order. First, Donahue and Wilkes 
have been widely cited, both in judicial opinions and in the aca­
151. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 2004). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. North Dakota Business Corporation Act, ch. 147, § 3, 1985 N.D. LAWS 411­
13 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (2010)). 
155. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) (2008) (permitting dissolution for corpora­
tions with thirty-five or fewer shareholders when “liquidation is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or 
shareholders”). 
156. See Act of June 5, 2001, ch. 316, § 58, 2001 Or. Laws 738, 761 (codified as 
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661(2)).  In 2001, the Oregon legislature adopted an 
expanded buyout provision for shareholders in close corporations that includes the rea­
sonable expectations language. Id. 
157. See A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act–Amendments Pertaining to Closely Held Corpora­
tions, 46 BUS. LAW. 297, 298-99 (1990). 
158. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2007). 
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demic literature.159  Courts have cited the opinions, together with 
O’Neal’s treatise, to rationalize the protection of minority share­
holders.160  The tendency of the courts has been to construe the 
“oppression” statutes broadly so that oppression includes disap­
pointing the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder.161 
This is, of course, the essence of Wilkes.  While the Massachusetts 
court did not use the term “reasonable expectations,” the plaintiff 
was granted relief precisely for that reason—Wilkes became in­
volved in Springside, the court said, “with the expectation that he 
would continue to participate in corporate decisions.”162 Donahue 
and Wilkes probably are favored by most academics,163 who, in 
turn, assume that the decisions represent the majority rule in the 
United States.164 
This infatuation with Donahue and Wilkes is not, however, 
without its detractors.  In her 2004 analysis of the legacy of these 
decisions, Professor Mary Siegel reaches a different conclusion, 
finding that “only five states . . . adopt the position that all share­
holders in close corporations owe enhanced, partnership fiduciary 
159. A Shepard’s search result for Wilkes conducted on July 6, 2010 produced 530 
total citations including 150 citing decisions and 192 citing law review articles.  A Shep­
ard’s search result for Donahue on the same day produced 847 total citations including 
281 citing decisions and 316 law review articles. SHEPARD REPORT FOR WILKES V. SPR­
INGSIDE  NURSING  HOME  INC., LEXISNEXIS, www.Lexisnexis.com (Select Shepardize 
and search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657) (last visited 
October 20, 2010). 
160. See, e.g., Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1988) (adopting broad view of oppression); In re the Judicial Dissolution of 
Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179  (N.Y. 1984) (“A shareholder who reasonably 
expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of 
corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security 
would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat 
those expectations.”); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987) (citing 
Kemp); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Math­
eson & Maler, supra note 142, at 676-80 (discussing these cases). “While the reasonable R 
expectations model may not yet fully represent a majority rule, courts in at least twenty-
one states have applied the language in some form.  Courts in several states have 
adopted the reasonable expectations test without ‘enabling’ language from the statute 
itself; that is, courts have applied the test even when the statute only provides that 
dissolution is available when conduct is ‘oppressive.’” Id. at 679 (footnotes omitted). 
161. See cases cited supra note 160. 
162. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664. 
163. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 380 (concluding that articles on this topic cite the 
Massachusetts cases as “uniformly depict[ing] the [holdings in Donahue and Wilkes] as 
the superior rule”). 
164. Id. (explaining that academic writings “characterize the Delaware . . . view 
as an unfortunate aberration from the national norm,” meaning the Massachusetts 
approach). 
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duties to each other.”165  While she did find that some states have 
adopted some aspects of this position or expressed sympathy for it, 
she nonetheless concludes that “[e]ven the most generous interpre­
tation, however, cannot transform the Massachusetts rule into any­
thing resembling a true majority rule.”166 
Professor Siegel also analyzes a number of post-Wilkes deci­
sions in Massachusetts, finding that these decisions narrow or limit 
the broad holdings of Donahue and Wilkes.167  For instance, she 
cites Merola v. Exergen, where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the firing of a minority shareholder, despite the ab­
sence of a legitimate business purpose, because those controlling 
the corporation needed “some room to maneuver.”168  The Merola 
court held that for a shareholder’s expectation of employment to be 
reasonable, and thus garner the protections of the Wilkes rule, 
there must be a general policy regarding ownership and employ­
ment, stock acquisition must be a condition of employment, and 
there must be a history of distributing profits in the form of com­
pensation.169  While not overruled, Wilkes was cabined.  Other 
Massachusetts cases similarly limited the reach of Donahue and 
Wilkes.170 
Against this ambivalence in Massachusetts, Professor Siegel 
analyzed a number of cases from outside of Massachusetts, led by 
Delaware,171 which reject the Massachusetts rule, in whole or in 
part.172  While the Delaware cases do clearly reject the Massachu­
setts rule, most other state court decisions are less emphatic in their 
165. Id. at 382. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 396-98. 
168. Id. at 394; Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996). 
169. Merola, 668 N.E.2d at 354-55. 
170. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 395-98 nn.91-108 (citing Horizon House-Micro­
wave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding freeze-out 
merger)); Goode v. Ryan, 489 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (Mass. 1986) (finding no general duty 
to purchase minority shareholder’s stock on death).  Professor Siegel cited a number of 
cases that required the minority shareholder to bring claims based on excessive com­
pensation derivatively, which means that the claim that such compensation freezes-out 
minority shareholders was rejected. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 395, n.93. 
171. Id. at 423-35. 
172. E.g., Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996) (holding 
that contract precludes claim based on fiduciary duty); Ueltzhoffer, v. Fox Fire Devel­
opment Co., No. 9871, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1991), aff’d, 
618 A.2d 90 (Del. 1992) (finding for the plaintiff, but declining to base its decision on 
fiduciary duty).  From these and other cases, Professor Siegel concludes, among other 
things, that “Delaware’s position is that all corporations are to be governed by corpo­
rate, not partnership, principles.”  Siegel, supra note 6, at 410. 
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refusal to distinguish between closely held and publicly held corpo­
rations.173  In my opinion, a broad look at these cases suggests that 
the basic idea of Donahue and Wilkes—that in closely held corpo­
rations those controlling the corporation owe some fiduciary duties 
to the minority shareholders—seems fairly well accepted.  Profes­
sor Siegel is correct, I believe, that the Massachusetts rule has been 
overstated and that its legacy is an evolving one.  Perhaps this is the 
fairest conclusion that can be drawn from her analysis. 
B. The Advent of the Limited Liability Company 
One would be remiss, I believe, in providing an historical anal­
ysis of the Donahue and Wilkes cases without mentioning the im­
pact of the limited liability company (LLC). This business entity 
first appeared in Wyoming shortly after Wilkes was decided. A Wy­
oming statute, passed in 1977, sought to create an entity with the 
tax attributes of a partnership, but with limited liability for all of the 
participants.174  When the Internal Revenue Service indicated that 
a Wyoming limited liability company would be taxed as a partner­
ship,175 LLC statutes were quickly passed in jurisdictions across the 
country.176  Today, all states have limited liability company acts, 
there have been two uniform limited liability company acts promul­
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws,177 and the LLC has become the dominant form of busi­
ness entity in the United States for newly formed businesses.178 
What is important here is that LLCs are perceived to be con­
tractual entities179 in contrast to corporations, which are generally 
173. Siegel, supra note 6, at 411 n.185. 
174. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101­
147 (2009). 
175. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-C.B. 360; see also Announcement 88-118, 1988-38 
I.R.B. 26; Joseph C. Vitek, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, 27 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 191, 197 (1993). 
176. Jimmy G. McLaughlin, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for 
Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231, 231 (1993). 
177. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 101-1206 (1996); REVISED  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT §§ 101-1106 (2006). 
178. See Rodney D. Chrisman, Essay, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the 
United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010).  The total number of new domestic 
LLCs formed in 2007 was 1,375,148, as opposed to 747,533 for new domestic corpora­
tions. Id. at 475.  Thus, there were 1,839 new domestic LLCs formed in 2007 for every 
one new domestic corporation. Id. 
179. E.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 23, 2009) (noting that an exculpatory provision “is permissible under the Dela­
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thought to be governed by mandatory statutory provisions.180  The 
typical limited liability company act contains few protections for 
members and most of these protections are waivable in the operat­
ing agreement.181  Indeed, in many limited liability company acts, 
the only nonwaivable protection for members of the limited liability 
company is the requirement that the managers of the company act 
in good faith.182  In the world of business entities, then, statutory 
corporate law should provide any protections to which shareholders 
are entitled, while members of a limited liability company should 
look to the terms of the operating agreement for their protection. 
Cases like Donahue and Wilkes, however, disturb this neat bal­
ance.  Under these cases, courts of equity can monitor the way mi­
nority stockholders are treated and provide a judicially created 
remedy when that treatment falls short of what the court perceives 
as fair treatment.  Massachusetts statutory law now supports this 
view, as the Massachusetts Business Corporation Act, in deference 
to the Massachusetts courts, contains no special protections for mi­
nority stockholders.183  A critical question for the future is whether 
the free-wheeling nature of the Donahue and Wilkes cases will be 
repeated in the realm of limited liability company law.  Moreover, 
is it appropriate to treat an LLC as an “incorporated partnership,” 
the basis for holding shareholders in a closely held corporation to 
partnership fiduciary duties?  Will the Massachusetts courts treat an 
operating agreement like a corporate code; that is, they will treat it 
as an incomplete record of protections to be afforded to those with 
a minority stake and not in control? 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken that path. 
In Pointer v. Castellani the court, citing Donahue and Wilkes, held 
that the president of an LLC, who also owned a forty-three percent 
interest in the LLC, was wrongfully frozen-out when the other 
ware Limited Liability Company Act and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Part­
nership Act, where freedom of contract is the guiding and overriding principle, it is 
expressly forbidden by the [Delaware General Corporation Law]”). See generally My­
ron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 (2009). 
180. See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 453, 457-66 (1997). 
181. U.L.L.C.A. § 103(b)(4) (2006) (“The operating agreement may not . . . elimi­
nate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 409(d), but the operat­
ing agreement may determine the standards by which performance of the obligation is 
to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”). 
182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18­
1101(E) (2005). 
183. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text. R 
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members removed him from his position.184  The court upheld the 
lower court’s findings that the reasons for his dismissal were pretex­
tual and, to the extent that the plaintiff did act inappropriately, 
there were measures short of dismissal (i.e., “communication” with 
the plaintiff)185 that should have been employed by the defend­
ants.186  What is troubling about this decision, however, is that the 
court summarily concluded that the LLC met the definition of a 
“close corporation”187 and, therefore, under Donahue the “stock­
holders” owe fiduciary duties to one another.188  The court never 
considered whether a limited liability company should be treated 
differently than a corporation and, indeed, never acknowledged 
that the parties to this litigation had formed a limited liability com­
pany.189  In fact, the court referred to the limited liability company 
as a “closely held corporate entity.”190  To those who trumpet the 
limited liability company as a contractual entity in which parties 
184. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818, 823 (Mass. 2009). 
185. Id. at 818. 
186. Id. at 818, 823. 
187. Id. at 815. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 808. Pointer is not the only Massachusetts case applying Wilkes and 
Donahue to an LLC.  In One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith, the appellate court 
affirmed a judgment in favor of a member of an LLC who complained that, in failing to 
abide by a buy-out agreement and in various other ways, his co-members breached their 
fiduciary duty to him.  One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith, 920 N.E.2d 303, 306, 
311 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).  Interestingly, the appellate court noted that the defendants 
admitted that they owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff and the court went on to con­
clude that this duty was breached because the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations were 
frustrated, citing Wilkes. Id. at 308.  In Holland v. Burke, the trial court, without dis­
cussion, assumed that Donahue and Wilkes applied to an LLC, although the plaintiff 
was unsuccessful in persuading the court that the defendants had breached any such 
fiduciary duties.  Holland v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A, 2008 WL 4514664, at *6, 
*12 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 18, 2008); see also Mastromatteo v. Mastromatteo, No. 
061329C, 2006 WL 3759512, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 2006) (proceeding on the 
assumption that Donahue applied to LLC). The Tennessee appellate court also has 
ruled that the members of an LLC owe fiduciary duties to one another: 
Pursuant to the above analysis, we are of the opinion that finding a majority 
shareholder [sic] of an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship to the minority, 
similar to the Supreme Court’s teaching in Nelson  [v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643 
(Tenn.1997)], regarding a corporation, is warranted in this case. Such a holding 
does not conflict with the statute, and is in keeping with the statutory require­
ment that each LLC member discharge all of his or her duties in good faith. 
Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003) (citing Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 649-51 (Tenn. 1997)). 
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must protect themselves, the possibility that courts will interfere 
poses a serious risk.191 
It is conceivable—perhaps probable—that more courts will 
treat LLCs as “incorporated partnerships” with the members owing 
one another fiduciary duties, notwithstanding any provisions in the 
statute that suggest otherwise.  This would be an unfortunate devel­
opment.  Organizers of LLCs would have to anticipate and draft 
around such decisions, adding transaction costs to the formation of 
the entity.  Another upshot will be the migration of LLC formation 
to Delaware, where the courts appear to be less inclined to blur the 
line between actual partnerships and LLCs. 
CONCLUSION 
Looking back at the questions posed at the beginning of this 
Article, it should be apparent that an examination of the history of 
Donahue and Wilkes does not provide easy answers and, indeed, 
raises additional questions.  The decisions were indeed path break­
ing, although they do reflect a judicial endorsement of forcefully 
stated academic positions and were decided against a background 
of cases expressing concern for the plight of minority stockhold­
ers.192 Donahue and Wilkes are best understood as the product of a 
particularly activist state court, headed by judges with strong pro­
gressive philosophies generated by their life experiences. 
The decisions have influenced courts around the country and 
are prominently discussed.  Careful scholarship, however, has 
demonstrated that they are not as dominant as conventional wis­
dom suggests.  Academic writing, which helped bring about the de­
cisions, now, for the most part, continues to promote the principles 
that those decisions established.193 
As to the effect of the decisions on state legislatures, it is not 
easy to draw many conclusions.  One inference, however, does 
seem clear: the Massachusetts legislature has abdicated to the Mas­
sachusetts courts the task of protecting minority stockholders from 
overreaching and oppressive conduct by those controlling Massa­
chusetts corporations.194  Less clear is the effect on other state legis­
latures.  My impression is that the Donahue and Wilkes decisions 
191. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2005). 
192. See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text. R 
194. See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text. R 
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heightened awareness across the country that minority stockholders 
were in a vulnerable position and, in response, many state legisla­
tures and courts have responded. 
The legacy of these decisions, however, does not end with the 
direct response to them.  As more litigation involving limited liabil­
ity companies occurs and is reported, we are likely to see courts 
expressing concern over “oppressive” conduct suffered by LLC 
members who failed to bargain, or bargained and failed, to protect 
themselves.195  Will Donahue and Wilkes then have a second life? 
Only time will tell.196 
195. The call for judicial protection of members of a limited liability company has 
begun in the academy. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liabil­
ity Company: Learning (or not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 883, 976 (2005) (“Just as courts developed the oppression doctrine to protect mi­
nority shareholders in close corporations, so too should courts extend the oppression 
doctrine to safeguard minority members in LLCs.  Learning from close corporation his­
tory, in other words, is important to the LLC’s future.”). 
196. Other than a single case from Tennessee and the Massachusetts cases de­
scribed in note 190, supra, it appears that neither Donahue nor Wilkes has been cited R 
by a court deciding a limited liability company case. A search run on July 8, 2010 on 
WestLaw with the search query (WILKES /2 SPRINGSIDE) (DONAHUE /2 RODD) 
& LLC “LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY” in the database “allcases” yielded no 
additional cases. ALLCASES  SEARCH, WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (search for 
(WILKES /2 SPRINGSIDE) (DONAHUE /2 RODD) & LLC “LIMITED LIABIL­
ITY COMPANY”) (last visited July8, 2010).  On the other hand, there are cases such 
Yessenow v. Hudson, where, reminiscent of Donahue and Wilkes, the court said “LLCs 
often have few members, who are regarded more as partners with direct obligations to 
one another than as mere shareholders in a corporation.” Yessenow v. Hudson, No. 
2:08-CV-353 PPS, 2009 WL 1543495, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 2009); see also Bushi v. 
Sage Health Care, PLLC, 203 P.3d 694, 699 (Idaho 2009) (“We conclude that, under 
Idaho’s original LLC act, members of an LLC owe one another fiduciary duties.”). But 
see Kaplan v. O.K. Technologies, L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 140-41 (N.C. App. 2009) (bas­
ing decision on the operating agreement, the court rejected the argument that members 
of a closely held LLC owe fiduciary duties to one another). 
